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The Effects of Gain Sharing on the Basic
Wage: The Case of IMPROSHARE
Roger T. Kaufman
Abstract. Although gain-sharing plans are typically promoted to workers as a way
of increasing total compensation, workers are often concerned that gain-sharing
bonuses may become substitutes for future wage increases that would have occurred
in the absence of the plan. I examine the theoretical and empirical interaction
among wages, bonuses, effort, and productivity in firms that implemented
IMPROSHARE, a well-known gain-sharing plan. Using longitudinal data obtained
from a detailed survey questionnaire, I find that one can usually reject both the
perfectly competitive model in which effort is held constant (in which case bonuses
are a perfect substitute for wages) and the ‘‘pure gravy’’ model (in which bonuses
completely complement the wage rate). There is no evidence that higher bonuses
lead to higher relative wages. The results, however, are not very robust. Although
the net effect of the bonuses on the wage rate is usually negative, it is not always
statistically significant.
Gain-sharing plans are typically promoted to workers as a way of
increasing total compensation. Workers, however, are often
concerned that any gain-sharing bonuses may become substitutes for
future wage increases that would have occurred in the absence of
the plan. In this paper I examine the theoretical interaction among
wages, bonuses, effort, and productivity to illustrate the conditions
under which bonuses will act as substitutes or complements for wage
gains. I then use longitudinal data obtained from a detailed survey
questionnaire to estimate the effects of the implementation of
IMPROSHARE, a well-known gain-sharing plan, on the base wage
rate. By using data for individual firms both before and after they
implement IMPROSHARE, I avoid the problem of firm
heterogeneity that typically plagues previous studies that use cross-
section data.
Roger T. Kaufman, Smith College, Northampton, Massachusetts.
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IMPROSHARE
IMPROSHARE  is a gain-sharing plan, which means that it is a
group incentive plan in which employee compensation is linked via
an explicit formula to some measure of improved company
performance. Created by industrial engineer Mitchell Fein (1981),
IMPROSHARE rewards all covered employees equally whenever
the actual number of labor hours used to produce output in the
current week or month is less than the estimated number it would
have taken to produce the current level of output in the ‘‘base
period’’. If the actual number of hours it takes to produce the
current level of output is more than the estimated number it would
have taken in the base period, no bonus is paid. All blue-collar and
white-collar employees except managers are typically included in the
plan.
In the absence of capital improvements the IMPROSHARE
bonus can be expressed as one-half of the percentage change in the
average physical product of labor between the base period and the
current period.1 Consequently, the compensation rate C consists of
the basic wage rate w and any positive bonus:
C\Max{w, w[1+(1/2)(Q/LµQBP/LBP)/(QBP/LBP)]} (1)
where the subscripts BP denote the levels of output and labor hours
in the base period. Thus, after a period in which physical
productivity is five percent above the base period, all covered
workers receive a bonus of 2.5% of their wage earnings. There are
no negative bonuses; workers are never paid less than the basic
wage rate.
The most commonly cited advantages of this form of physical
productivity gain-sharing compared with the more well-known
Scanlon and Rucker plans are: (1) it is easy for workers to
comprehend, (2) physical productivity is something workers can
control, and (3) management need not reveal sensitive corporate
financial information. Although several studies have examined the
changes in productivity following the introduction of
IMPROSHARE plans [Fein (1983), Globerson and Parsons (1987),
and Kaufman (1992)], no study has examined the effects of
IMPROSHARE on the base wage rate.
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Theoretical impact of bonuses on the base wage rate
Although there are numerous theoretical avenues by which gain-
sharing bonuses might affect the basic wage rate, in this section I
focus on three: the simple textbook competitive model in which
effort is not explicitly considered, an imperfectly competitive model
in which bonuses are treated as ‘‘add-on’s’’, and a neoclassical
perfectly competitive model in which effort is endogenous and
included in the utility function.
In the simple textbook model of a competitive labor market,
effort is not considered and worker utility depends solely on the
compensation rate, which includes the basic wage plus any
IMPROSHARE bonus. If the labor market is perfectly competitive
and labor is homogeneous, all firms must pay the same market
equilibrium compensation rate. Consequently, any IMPROSHARE
bonus would result in an equal reduction in that firm’s basic wage
rate relative to the wages paid by other firms to comparable workers.
This is sometimes known as the ‘‘no gravy’’ theory of bonuses
because it implies that workers ‘‘pay’’ for bonuses in the form of
lower wages and bonuses have no impact on compensation.
Although it assumes perfectly competitive labor markets, it is often
promulgated by labor union leaders who are concerned that firms
will merely substitute bonuses for wage increases.
Most economists do not believe that labor markets are perfectly
competitive auction markets with a unique market equilibrium
compensation rate. Krueger and Summers (1988), for example,
found persistent inter-industry differences in occupational wage
rates and fringe benefits after controlling for differences in a host of
human capital and demographic variables, and economists have
replicated their results for other countries. In the absence of perfect
competition and free entry, bonuses may reflect firm or industry
rents and may not be accompanied by reductions in the wage rate
even if productivity is unaffected. In this case bonuses may merely
be ‘‘add-on’s’’ or ‘‘pure gravy’’ and have no effect on relative wages.
Furthermore, IMPROSHARE itself may affect productivity, firm
profits, and relative wages. Since IMPROSHARE bonuses are equal
to only half of any productivity improvements, higher bonuses
resulting from higher productivity might lead to higher profits and
higher relative wage rates. Carruth and Oswald (1989) and Hildreth
and Oswald (1997) present formal Nash bargaining models and
modified competitive models in which firm profits and wages are
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positively correlated. They also provide substantial empirical support
for this proposition. This is also the view publicly espoused by those
who market gain-sharing plans.
Finally, consider the effects of gain sharing when worker effort is
endogenous. This can be analyzed in the context of either a market-
clearing model or a bargaining model. Worker utility is then a
function of both the compensation rate and effort:
U\U(C, Effort) (2)
where U1a0, U2s0, U11s0, and U22s0. A diminishing marginal
rate of substitution between the compensation rate and the
complement of effort (which I shall call ‘‘on-the-job leisure’’)
implies that the workers’ initial indifference curve I0 depicted in
Figure 1 will be convex and positively-sloped. Thus, workers must
receive progressively larger compensation rate increases to induce
Figure 1.
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them to work harder. Let the initial equilibrium be Point A.
Workers are paid a basic wage w0 and expend an amount of effort
per hour equal to E0. While monitoring is difficult and costly, it is
assumed that supervisors can identify those workers whose effort
levels are less than E0, and these workers are dismissed.2 If there is
a competitive labor market and no efficiency wages, workers can
achieve the initial level of utility U0, which is equal to the level of
utility along I0, in any firm.
The ‘‘Gain-sharing’’ curve GS1, illustrates the combinations of
compensation and effort that are available to the workers after the
firm implements an IMPROSHARE plan. As workers provide
greater effort, productivity rises. Since workers receive
IMPROSHARE bonuses equal to half of any increases in average
physical productivity, the compensation rate rises. Note that no
bonus is paid until effort exceeds E0, in accordance with the
IMPROSHARE formula. Given the linkage between productivity
and the IMPROSHARE bonus, the concavity of the Gain-Sharing
Curve to the right of E0 implies that there are diminishing returns to
increased work effort. GS1 is horizontal once the compensation rate
falls to w0 (at E0) because workers are guaranteed the basic wage w0
under IMPROSHARE even if productivity falls. Firms, however, are
still able to dismiss workers if their effort falls below E0.
In the current contract period the basic wage rate remains
unchanged (w1\w0), and workers can increase their utility by
moving to Point B, at higher levels of effort (E1) and compensation.
Based on anecdotal evidence and the fact that productivity gains are
split evenly between labor and management, it is assumed that
movements along any GS curve to the northeast increase firm
profits.3
In the next contract period, however, firms operating in a
competitive labor market will have an incentive to reduce the basic
wage, which will shift the Gain-Sharing Curve down. In Figure 1, for
example, firms can earn higher profits at Point C, which lies on a
lower Gain-Sharing Curve. Compared with Point B, Point C has a
lower basic wage w2, a lower rate of total compensation, and a
greater level of effort E2. Consequently, the level of worker utility
returns to U2\U0, which is the competitive market equilibrium level
of worker utility. Although workers receive higher compensation at
Point C than at Point A (since the gain-sharing bonus exceeds the
reduction in the basic wage), they provide greater effort. Their level
of utility is equal to that obtained at other firms, so they remain with
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© Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998.
the firm. The situation depicted by the move to Point C is consistent
with the concern of many workers that gain-sharing bonuses will
result in wage rates being lower than they would have been
otherwise. The model, however, predicts no decline in worker utility.
In a competitive labor market workers can always choose to work
elsewhere for the market equilibrium level of utility U0. Note that
along GS2 (as well as along GS1) bonuses are paid only if EaE0,
according to the IMPROSHARE formula.
Note also that the tangency between the Gain-Sharing Curve GS2
and I2 (which is the same as I0) lies to the right of E1. This is the
result of the assumption that on-the-job leisure, or reduced work
effort, is a normal good. Consequently, a reduction in real income
following a cut in the basic wage will induce workers to cut back on
their consumption of on-the-job leisure by providing more work
effort. This also implies that firms will be unable to induce workers
to exert more effort by increasing the basic wage rate without
changing the gain-sharing formula.
Points B and C represent two extremes on an (undrawn) contract
curve that connects them. At Point B workers are able to maximise
their utility gains resulting from the implementation of gain sharing.
At Point C workers do not benefit from the plan. Firms keep 50%
of the productivity gains in any event, but gain sharing is even more
profitable for the firm if worker utility returns to the competitive
market equilibrium. The assumption of perfectly competitive labor
markets implies that the long-run equilibrium is Point C. Whether
this occurs in fact is an empirical question, and Point C need not be
the long-run equilibrium in a bargaining model.
As Figure 1 illustrates, neoclassical models in which effort is
endogenous predict that total monetary compensation will be higher
in gain-sharing firms in order to induce workers to provide greater
effort. Even under the valid ‘‘no gravy’’ scenario in which worker
utility remains unchanged at the market equilibrium and the basic
wage rate falls, the monetary compensation rate increases from
Point A to Point C. Empirical findings that monetary compensation
is higher in gain-sharing or profit-sharing firms neither prove nor
disprove the ‘‘gravy’’ or ‘‘add-on’’ theory of gain-sharing bonuses.
This model also predicts that the basic wage rate will remain
constant or decline by somewhat less than the IMPROSHARE
bonus.
The models presented in this section could be extended in a
variety of directions. First, risk-averse workers will prefer a fixed
© Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998.
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basic wage rather than a smaller wage and bonus with the same
expected total present value because the bonus is uncertain. On the
other hand, if gain sharing results in greater employment stability
via Weitzman’s (1984) vacuum effect,4 the desirability of gain
sharing would be enhanced and workers would prefer it to a normal
(risky) job with the same average compensation rate. Finally, in a
world with heterogeneous workers, firms with gain-sharing plans will
be more attractive to workers who derive a smaller disutility from
providing work effort.
Previous empirical results
Previous researchers have typically used a cross-section sample of
firms, some of which utilize profit sharing, and regressed total
compensation or wage earnings on a host of variables that control
for the human capital attributes of the workers, firm size, industry,
geographical location, etc. Mitchell, Lewin, and Lawler (1990), for
example, use BLS industry wage surveys and find that workers in
firms with monetary incentive systems receive 14% higher wages.
Brown (1990) found similar results using establishment data. These
estimates have been criticised, however, because they do not account
for labor sorting, and the existence of profit-sharing plans was taken
to be exogenous.
Hart and Hubler (1991) account for this endogeneity by using
Heckman’s procedure for correcting for sample selection bias. Using
a sample of 3,628 German workers, of whom 196 participated in
profit-sharing plans, they find that the level of profit sharing is
positively related to regular wage and non-wage payments, and is
therefore a complement rather than a substitute for basic wages.
The independent variables that control for other differences among
workers and firms, however, are incomplete.
Finally, Wadhwani and Wall (1988) estimated a fixed effects
model using panel data from 96 manufacturing companies in the
United Kingdom to control for individual firm influences on the
wage rate over time. The fixed effects model was able to isolate the
effects of profit-sharing in those 18 firms that implemented such
plans because many of the 18 firms either introduced or
discontinued their plans during the sample period. Wadhwani and
Wall could not reject the hypothesis that profit-sharing bonuses had
no effect on the basic wage rate. The current study is similar to
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Wadhwani and Wall’s in that I also use longitudinal data for
individual firms to avoid the problem of heterogeneity. In addition,
my sample includes a substantially larger number of firms, all with
the same gain-sharing plan. Finally, the average bonus in my sample
is about twice as big as that in Wadhwani and Wall’s study.
Therefore, any wage effects should be easier to detect.
The IMPROSHARE survey questionnaire
The firm-specific data used in this study were obtained from the
repsonses to a survey questionnaire that was sent to all 273 known
companies and divisions that had implemented IMPROSHARE
from its inception in 1978 to April, 1988. 45% of those companies
that were contracted either completely or partially completed the
survey. While it is difficult to ascertain whether my sample is
unbiased, Mitchell Fein has estimated that 15–20% of all companies
that implemented IMPROSHARE eventually discontinued it. In my
sample 23.2% of the plans were discontinued, suggesting that my
sample is reasonably representative.
The survey data that are relevant for this study include: (1) the
average hourly wage rate for production workers, excluding the
IMPROSHARE bonus, at IMPROSHARE’s start, and one and two
years before and after its implementation; (2) the average
IMPROSHARE bonus during the first and second full years after
IMPROSHARE’s implementation; and (3) the annual quit rates
during the company’s first year with IMPROSHARE and during the
preceding year.
Respondents were also asked to list the major products or services
produced within the plant as well as the relevant 4-digit SIC Code
number. The wage rate for the corresponding 3 or 4-digit SIC Code
Industry number was collected for the month in which
IMPROSHARE was introduced and one and two years before and
after this date using various issues of Employment and Earnings. SIC
Codes were assigned to those firms that did not provide them by
matching the firms’s major products with code numbers in the
Standard Industrial Classifications Manuals for 1972 and 1987. The
relative wages for each firm at various points in time were then
calculated by dividing the basic wage rate in the firm in each
relevant month by the average wage rate in its industry for the same
month.
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Empirical results.
55% of the 97 American firms in my sample identified their
principal products and provided data on the basic wage rate at the
time of IMPROSHARE’s introduction and one year later.6 Among
these 55 firms the average ratio between the individual firm’s wage
rate at the time it introduced IMPROSHARE and the then-
prevailing wage rate in its industry was 90.91%. Although previous
researchers have typically found wages to be higher in firms that use
profit sharing or piece rates, my results were not surprising. Firms
that implement IMPROSHARE tend to be experiencing either
financial difficulties or some erosion in competitive position. In
addition, firms that use IMPROSHARE have fewer employees than
their industry average, and Brown, Hamilton, and Medoff (1990)
have found that firm size is positively correlated with labor
compensation after adjusting for observable differences in labor
quality.7,8
There was a substantial amount of variation in the relative wage
among the firms, and this is reflected in a large standard deviation
of 18.90 percentage points. Among these 55 firms, 54 firms had
wages between 62.7 and 129.5% of their corresponding industry
wage in the month they implemented IMPROSHARE, and the
remaining firm had a relative wage of 165.5%.
Although my survey did not provide data on the value of each
firm’s capital stock or the human capital composition of its work
force,9 a simple regression of the logarithm of the relative wage
rates on a union dummy variable indicated that unionisation
increased a firm’s relative wage by 11–14 percentage points. This
coefficient was statistically significant and within the range of
estimates from more sophisticated techniques [Lewis (1986)].
In Table 1 I list the ratio of the firm to industry wage rates at
several points in time. The number of firms in each comparison
reflects the number of firms that provided wage data for the relevant
periods. Among the aforementioned 55 firms, the average ratio of
the wage rate as a percentage of the corresponding industry wage
fell slightly from 90.91% at IMPROSHARE’s introduction to
90.37% one year later, a difference that is not statistically significant.
Median data also revealed no significant changes. The relative wage
rose in 23 of these firms during the first year of IMPROSHARE and
declined in the remaining 32. Among these same 55 firms, the
average IMPROSHARE bonus paid during the first year was 6.7%.
Even with the average 6.7% bonus, however, the average monetary
Gain Sharing and the Wage Rate 603
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Table 1. Relative wage rates
Average ratio of firm wage divided by the prevailing industry wage (expressed as a percent) in the month
2 years before 1 year before Of 1 year after 2 years after No.
IMPROSHARE’s IMPROSHARE’s IMPROSHARE’s IMPROSHARE’s IMPROSHARE’s of

















































compensation rate among the IMPROSHARE firms was still less
after one year than the average wage in the typical firm in its
industry. These data also indicate that the relative wage in these
firms had remained practically constant for at least two years prior
to IMPROSHARE’s introduction.10
It has been argued that gain-sharing plans that reward
productivity will merely attract more productive workers. The
average quit rate among the 51 firms that reported quit data was
13.07% the first year the company utilised IMPROSHARE. This
was insignificantly less than the 13.17% quit rate during the
preceding year. Although this evidence is not conclusive, the relative
constancy of the quit rate may imply that no substantial labor
sorting occurred.11
In Table 2 I test the hypothesis that changes in relative wages
among IMPROSHARE firms will differ according to the size of the
IMPROSHARE bonuses received by workers at these firms. The
dependent variable in the regression in Table 2 is the logarithm of
the ratio of the firm’s wage rate divided by the average wage in its
industry (i.e., the logarithm of the relative wage) one and two years
after IMPROSHARE’s introduction. Since the bonus is measured as
a percentage of the basic wage, this specification allows me to
estimate the percentage by which a one percentage point increase in
the bonus affects the basic firm wage rate, assuming the industry
wage is unaffected. I also allow for a nonlinear relationship between
the bonus and the basic wage by adding the square of the bonus in
some regressions, and I tested for differences in the responses in
union and non-union firms (and found none). Finally, I include the
relative wage at the time of IMPROSHARE’s implementation to
test for persistence effects. Because the last variable may be affected
by the contemporaneous introduction of IMPROSHARE, I
estimated these equations using both ordinary least squares and
instrumental variables. In the latter regressions the relative wage
one year prior to IMPROSHARE’s implementation was used as the
instrument for the relative wage in the month in which
IMPROSHARE was introduced.
Initial estimations revealed no significant linear relationships but a
significant nonlinear relationship in which small bonuses reduced
subsequent wages and large bonuses increased them. Further
investigation indicated that this nonlinear relationship resulted from
one outlying observation in which the first year bonus was 32%,
almost twice as large as the next largest bonus. Consequently, this
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Table 2. Determinants of one-year and two-year changes in relative wage rates
Dependent variable: logarithm of the relative wage 1 year after IMPROSHARE’s introduction
Average Average Log of relative
first-year first-year wage in the month Number
IMPROSHARE IMPROSHARE IMPROSHARE was of
bonusa bonus squared introduced R̄2 firms
OLS estimates
µ0.040 1.00 0.977 53
(0.087)a (0.022)
Instrumental variables estimates
µ0.503 0.033 1.02 0.977 52
(0.299) (0.017) (0.022)
µ0.041 1.01 0.976 52
(0.088) (0.027)
Dependent variable: logarithm of the relative wage 2 years after IMPROSHARE’s introduction
Average Average Log of relative
first-year second-year wage in the month Number
IMPROSHARE IMPROSHARE IMPROSHARE was of
bonusa bonus introduced R̄2 firms
OLS estimates
µ0.481 0.979 0.904 38
(0.235) (0.053)
Instrumental variables estimates
µ0.487 0.964 0.899 37
(0.231) (0.055)
µ0.631 0.138 0.975 0.886 35
(0.442) (0.319) (0.062)
Note: aAll coefficients and their standard errors, which are written below the coefficients in parentheses, have been multiplied by 100, except those for the
















observation was dropped in the sample for the regressions reported
in Table 2.
The regressions in the top panel of Table 2 indicate that the first-
year bonus has no significant effect on the wage rate after one year
although the coefficient is negative and borderline significant when
the quadratic term is included. According to the three regressions in
the bottom panel, however, a 1% bonus during the first year reduces
the wage rate by about 0.5% after two years. This coefficient is
significantly different from 0 at the 95, 95, and 80% levels of
significance respectively. The net effect of bonuses on relative wages
is also significantly different from µ0.1. Other regressions indicate
that this negative impact is larger among nonunion firms than
among unionized firms, but the sample sizes are quite small. There
is no evidence that relative wages will rise along with the bonus.
Taken together, these results imply that wages fall but not by the
full amont of the bonus.12
Conclusion
The empirical results presented in the preceding section indicate
that one can usually reject both the perfectly competitive model in
which effort is excluded (in which case the coefficient on the bonus
in the wage rate regression would equal µ1.0) and the ‘‘pure gravy’’
model (in which the coefficient would equal 0). There is no evidence
that higher bonuses lead to higher relative wages. These results,
however, are consistent with both the ‘‘no gravy’’ scenario, in which
worker utility remains constant but workers must be compensated
for providing greater work effort, and the partial gravy or
imperfectly competitive model, in which worker utility rises. It
should be noted, however, that this result is not very robust.
Although the net effect of the bonuses is almost always negative, it
is not always significant.
Notes
1 When there is a significant change in technology or a purchase of capital
equipment exceeding $15,000, firms are allowed to revise the ‘‘base period’’
coefficients to reap 90% of the labor-saving gains. See Fein (1981) or Kaufman
(1992) for more details.
2 At Point A workers would also be willing to accept a lower wage rate in return
for expanding less effort. This, too, is assumed to be infeasible. This initial
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inefficiency is required in order for there to be a Pareto-superior gain-sharing
solution with strictly convex indifference curves.
3 I implicitly assume that any free-rider effects are overcome via peer pressure or
guilt [Lazear (1992)]. Weitzman and Kruse (1990) add that the implicit
compensation-effort negotiations between workers and management may be viewed
as a repeated game in which the cooperative solution may be one of the possible
outcomes. If some free-rider problems remain, individual workers will not reap the
full benefits of their extra effort, which would flatten the slope of the GS curve.
4 This will be true unless product demand is extremely inelastic and firms are not
allowed to reduce employment.
5 Although Weitzman’s model is usually applied to profit or revenue sharing, his
basic model and results merely require that the marginal cost of labor curve lie
below the average cost of labor curve. This will also arise in an IMPROSHARE plan
because of the declining marginal physical product of labor.
6 The remaining 15 firms were Canadian. Two US firms that reported wage data
were excluded from the sample. One firm had negotiated a deferred profit-sharing
plan prior to IMPROSHARE; the second had another regular bonus system before
IMPROSHARE but did not report any data about the bonuses.
7 The wage ratio may also be biased downwards because the numerator represents
the firm wage rate while the denominator measures hourly earnings in the industry,
which includes overtime premiums.
8 There is a separate issue concerning the relationship between firm size and
subsequent increases in productivity following the implementation of gain sharing.
As stated in Footnote 3, the free-rider problem implies that workers in larger firms
have less financial incentive to increase their individual effort. Kaufman (1992)
found that gain sharing is more successful in increasing productivity among firms
with fewer employees, especially among nonunion firms; a 10% increase in the
number of employees reduced the productivity gain after one year by about 0.5
percentage points. In this larger, more inclusive study of profit and gain-sharing
firms Kruse (1993) divided his sample into five size classes. Although firms in the
smallest size class experienced the largest productivity gains, firms in the largest size
class experienced the second largest gain.
9 These data were requested in the original draft of my survey along with sales and
price data, but a pre-screening sample indicated that many firms would refuse to
provide them.
10 The number of firms providing wage data two full years after IMPROSHARE’s
introduction is less than the number providing wage data one year out partially
because there is a substantial number of firms that introduced IMPROSHARE
between September 1986 and September 1987. At the time of the survey in
September 1988, these firms had not yet had two full years of experience with
IMPROSHARE.
11 This is obviously a weak influence. The fact that the quit rate did not change
does not rule out the possibility that there was a change in the type of workers who
quit.
12 Since the wage data refer to wages negotiated one and two years after the
introduction of IMPROSHARE, there is no a priori reason to suspect that the error
term is correlated with previous bonuses. Estimations in which these bonuses were
treated as endogenous (and the number of employees and union status were
included as instruments), however, did not materially affect the size of the
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coefficients, but did render them insignificant. The R2 for the reduced form of the
bonus equation, however, never exceeded 0.05.
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